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Abstract
This article analyses the diplomatic crisis that arose after Ukraine adopted a new Law 
on Education in 2017. A number of Ukraine’s neighbouring countries responded nega-
tively to the Law, arguing that it violates minority communities’ right to mother tongue 
education. Hungary’s reaction was the most serious, which led to the blocking of 
Ukraine’s nato and EU integration. The conflict worsened in 2018; Hungary continues 
to veto Ukraine’s integration process, while Ukraine has put pressure on the Hungarian 
community in Transcarpathia. The European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission) recommended that Ukraine amend the Law, while nato 
and the US called on Hungary and Ukraine to end their disagreement through bilateral 
negotiations. This article argues that the Law on Education does not comply with in-
ternational minority rights norms ratified by Ukraine, and that the current crisis is an 
unfortunate consequence of the ineffective multilateral enforcement of minority 
rights.
Keywords
Ukraine – Hungary – Law on Education – Venice Commission – minority rights – 
Framework Convention – nato – securitization
1 Introduction
In 2017, a serious conflict arose between two neighbouring countries of Central 
Eastern Europe when Hungary blocked Ukraine’s integration process with 
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nato and the European Union. On the face of it, this clash seems illogical as 
Hungary is a supporter of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Hungary’s steps 
undermine the EU’s and nato’s united stance in support of Ukraine, and ef-
fectively benefit none other than Russia, which is currently under sanctions 
from the EU and the US.
Hungary does, however, have a recent history of friendly relations with Rus-
sia, which has resulted in steps hostile to Ukraine in the past.1 That said, the 
Hungarian government has vehemently denied any allegations that, in this in-
stance, it is acting in support of Russia.2 Instead, it has justified its actions by 
referring to Ukraine’s adoption of the 2017 Law on Education, which limits the 
rights of national minorities to mother tongue education.3
In 2018, the Law on Education continued to occupy headlines and remained 
a topic of heated domestic and international discussions. This article describes 
these and connected developments, and provides an analysis of the underly-
ing cause of the tensions around the Law on Education. It argues that the crisis 
is an unfortunate consequence of the lack of effective multilateral tools to en-
force norms on minority rights. In this situation, states willing to act as kin-
states have only blunt instruments at their disposal, which often result in bilat-
eral conflicts. In the presence of particular factors, the conflict is likely to 
escalate rather than being resolved amicably.
2 Ukraine’s 2017 Law on Education
On 5 September 2017, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, adopt-
ed a new Law on Education, which sets the general framework for all public 
education in the country, from pre-school to university level.4 The Law aims 
to modernize the educational process by bringing it into compliance with 
1 Stanislava Brajerčíková and Marek Lenč, “Walking on Thin Ice: Slovak Perspective on Ukraine 
Crisis”, 7(1) Ideology and Politics (2015), 235–256, at 242.
2 “Szijjártó: hazugság, hogy orosz megrendelés állna a magyar Ukrajna-politika mögött” [Szijj-
ártó: it is a lie that there is Russian order behind the Hungarian Ukraine-policy”], Kisalföld, 
27 April 2018, at <https://www.kisalfold.hu/belfold_hirek/szijjarto_hazugsag_hogy_orosz_me 
grendeles_allna_a_magyar_ukrajna-politika_mogott/2558350/>.
3 Tóth Tünde, “Az oktatási törvényről folytatott tárgyalás eredményei” [Results of the negotia-
tions over the law on education], Kárpátalja.ma, 22 June 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/
karpatalja/oktatas/az-oktatasi-torvenyrol-folytatott-targyalas-eredmenyei/>.
4 Закон України “Про освіту” [Ukraine’s Law “On Education”], No. 2145-viii, 5 September 
2017, at <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2145-19/page>; an English translation is avail-
able under: European Venice Commission, Ukraine – The Law on Education adopted by the 
Verkhovna Rada on 5 September 2017, cdl-ref(2017)047-e, 15 November 2017.
 Please check the unpaired quotation mark in this sentence “…Hungarian Ukraine-policy”.
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 Western educational standards. It was immediately welcomed by the US Em-
bassy in Ukraine as an investment in youth, key for the country’s future.5
The education reform is one of many sectorial reforms Ukraine needs to 
undertake as part of its integration process. The Law has many positive as-
pects, related to modernizing the educational process in general, but these are 
not the object of this study.6 Besides its progressive features, the Law also in-
cludes the controversial Article 7, which changes the rules on education in mi-
nority languages, affecting many of Ukraine’s minority communities. This ar-
ticle immediately became a source of criticism from countries neighbouring 
Ukraine, namely Hungary, Romania, Poland and Moldova, as well as Greece 
and Bulgaria.7 The tensions between Hungary and Ukraine continue to this 
day.
2.1 The Context of the Law’s Adoption
To understand the controversy, one has to analyse the context of the Law’s 
adoption from the perspective of the different parties involved. Since its inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been preoccupied with the lan-
guage debate, one of the most important and least successful of its nation-
building projects.8 In Soviet times, the Ukrainian language was suppressed by 
the authorities and Russian was widely promoted as a de facto official language 
and the language of education.9 After independence, Ukrainian became the 
sole state language, but it has not completely eclipsed the Russian language.10 
A large portion of the population, mainly in the Eastern and Southern parts of 
the country, still uses Russian as a means of primary communication, watches 
5 Twitter account of the US Embassy in Kyiv, @USEmbassyKyiv, 1:46 AM – 10 September 
2017, at <https://twitter.com/usembassykyiv/status/906801089181306880>.
6 Margarita Tulup, “Beyond the Scandal: What is Ukraine’s New Education Law Really 
About?”, Open Democracy, 8 December 2017, at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/
odr/ukraines-new-education-law/>.
7 Tomasz Daborowski, Tomasz Piechal and Andrzej Sadecki, “Ukraine: A Blow Against 
the  National Minorities’ School System”, osw – Centre for Eastern Studies, 27 September 
2017, at <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-09-27/ukraine-a-blow 
-against-national-minorities-school-system>.
8 Csilla Fedinec and István Csernicskó, “(Re)conceptualization of Memory in Ukraine after 
the Revolution of Dignity”, 5(1) Central European Papers, (2017), 46–71.
9 Bill Bowring, “The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of 
State-building?”, in Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (ed.), The Russian Language Outside the Nation 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2014), 56–80.
10 István Csernicskó, “A kétnyelvű Ukrajna” [Bilingual Ukraine], in Kornélia Hires-László 
(ed.), Nyelvhasználat, kétnyelvűség. Tanulmányok a Hodinka Antal Nyelvészeti Kutatóköz-
pont kutatásaiból [Language Use, Bilingualism. Studies from the Research of the Hodinka 
Antal Linguistic Research Institute] (Autdor-Shark, Uzhhorod, 2016), 13–44.
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Russian media and studies in Russian.11 The other minority communities are 
rather negligible, but citizens declaring Russian ethnicity still make up 17.3% 
of the population, and approximately 30% of the population consider Russian 
their mother tongue.12
Successive Ukrainian governments have adopted laws suppressing or fa-
vouring minority languages, depending on their pro-Russian or anti-Russian 
stance.13 Ukraine also ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (fcnm) and the European Charter for Regional or Minor-
ity Languages (ecrml),14 which paradoxically led to the lowering of language 
standards for minorities, as the implementing legislation replaced a previous 
language law, which had been more favourable to minorities.15 Since 2000, sev-
eral laws limiting the use of minority languages in public administration, me-
dia, culture16 and education have been adopted.17 The 2010 presidential elec-
tions were won by Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian candidate, and his 
supporters won the 2012 parliamentary elections as well.18 The newly formed 
government adopted the 2012 Language Law,19 which strengthened the posi-
tion of the Russian language, but was strongly opposed by nationalist forces,20 
11 Ibid.
12 István Csernicskó, Államok, nyelvek, államnyelvek. Nyelvpolitika a mai Kárpátalja területén 
(1867–2010) [States, Languages, State Languages. Language Policy on the Territory of Cur-
rent Transcarpathia] (Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2013), 240–243.
13 István Csernicskó and Csilla Fedinec, “Four Language Laws of Ukraine”, 4 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2016), 560–582.
14 Bill Bowring and Myroslava Antonovych, “Ukraine’s Long and Winding Road to the Euro-
pean Charter for Regional or Minority Languages”, in Robert Dunbar (ed.), The European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Legal Challenges and Opportunities (Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg, 2008), 157–182.
15 Bill Bowring, “International Standards and Obligations, and Ukrainian Law and Legisla-
tion”, in Julianne Besters-Dilger (ed.), Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: 
Analysis and Recommendations (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2009), 57–100.
16 István Csernicskó, “Ukrajna nyelvi helyzete egy amerikai film szinkronja tükrében” [The 
State of Ukraine’s Languages through the Lenses of Translation of an American Movie], 1 
Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle (2014), 93–104.
17 István Csernicskó and Viktória Ferenc, “Education as an Ideal Means of Achieving a Na-
tion State in Ukraine”, in Jolán Róka (ed.), Concepts & Consequences of Multilingualism in 
Europe (Budapest College of Communication and Business, Budapest, 2010), 329–349.
18 Bill Bowring, “Law in a Linguistic Battlefield: The Language of the New State Versus the 
‘Language of the Oppressors’ in Ukraine”, 1 International Journal of Language and Law 
(2012), 87–105.
19 Закон України “Про засади державної мовної політики” [Law of Ukraine “On the 
Principles of State Language Policy”], No. 5029-vi, 03 July 2012.
20 István Csernicskó and Csilla Fedinec, “Nyelvpolitika határon: a 2012-es ukrajnai 
 nyelvtörvény elő- és utóéletéről” [Language Policy on the Borders: Build-up and Follow-up 
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and also criticized by the European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission).21 This government was overthrown by a second wave of 
protests known as Euromaidan in 2014 and replaced by a Western-oriented 
government, which was more antagonistic towards Russia and less supportive 
of the interests of the Russian community in Ukraine. One of the new parlia-
ment’s first steps, as an expression of anti-Russian sentiment, was to repeal the 
2012 Language Law. This repeal did not, however, enter into force, as it was not 
signed by the parliamentary chair, Oleksandr Turchynov, due to domestic and 
international protests.22
The 2014 Euromaidan protests led to serious conflict within Ukraine and 
between Ukraine and its powerful neighbour, Russia.23 In 2014, Russian forces 
occupied the Crimean Peninsula, which has an ethnic Russian majority. Russia 
later annexed Crimea after a local referendum, internationally condemned as 
invalid, supported this step.24 Two Eastern regions with an ethnic Russian ma-
jority in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts also declared independence from 
Ukraine and started an armed struggle against the central government, with 
Russia’s support.25
The 2017 Law on Education was adopted in the context of these geopo-
litical struggles. Ukraine is currently in open conflict with Russia. As part of 
the struggle, the government wishes to limit Russian influence, including 
in education and the media. Russia has, in fact, exerted considerable influ-
ence over Russian-speaking populations of the former Soviet Union through 
 Russian-speaking and Kremlin-friendly media.26
to the 2012 Ukrainian Language Law], in Anita Márku and Kornélia Hires-László (eds.), 
Nyelvoktatás, kétnyelvűség, nyelvi tájkép. Tanulmányok a Hodinka Antal Nyelvészeti 
 Kutatóközpont kutatásaiból [Teaching of languages, bilingualism, linguistic landscape. 
Studies from the research of the Hodinka Antal Linguistic Research Institute] (Autdor-
Shark, Uzhhorod, 2015), 206–238.
21 Venice Commission, Ukraine – Opinion No. 605/2010 on the Draft Law on Languages in 
Ukraine, cdl-AD(2011)008, 30 March 2011.
22 István Csernicskó, Nyelvpolitika a háborús Ukrajnában [Language Policy in Wartime 
Ukraine] (Autdor Shark, Uzhhorod, 2016), 120–124.
23 Sergey Sayapin and Evhen Tsybulenko (eds.), The Use of Force against Ukraine and Inter-
national Law: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello, Jus Post Bellum (Asser Press/Springer, The Hague, 
2018).
24 Paul D’Anieri, “Gerrymandering Ukraine? Electoral Consequences of Occupation”, East 
European Politics and Societies and Cultures (2018), 1–20.
25 Ibid.
26 Triin Vihalemm and Anu Masso, “(Re)Construction of Collective Identities after the Dis-
solution of the Soviet Union: The Case of Estonia”, 35(1) Nationalities Papers (2007), 
71–91.
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From the perspective of minority communities, however, the context is dif-
ferent. Ukraine is in a conflict with Russia, but its steps limiting Russian influ-
ence are affecting its own citizens, many of whom are not responsible for and 
do not sympathize with the Russian government’s actions. This is especially 
pronounced for non-Russian minorities who might genuinely support Ukraine 
in its pro-Western and anti-Russian orientation, but are nevertheless subject to 
conditions limiting their rights.
From the perspective of minorities, the curtailment of mother tongue edu-
cation is just another step in a longer series of attacks on their educational es-
tablishments. In fact, turning mother tongue education into bilingual educa-
tion in Ukraine was already proposed in 2008, although unsuccessfully at that 
time.27 Subsequent governments made several steps to limit mother tongue 
education, for example by requiring the passing of school-leaving exams in 
Ukrainian as a precondition of university admission, which has severely af-
fected graduates of minority schools.28
Not all minority communities are equally affected by alterations in policies 
in minority education. Members of some communities, such as Poles or Be-
larusians, are largely linguistically assimilated. The majority of them have 
Ukrainian or Russian as mother tongue, and there are very few schools teach-
ing in their languages. On the other hand, Hungarians and Romanians are al-
most entirely Hungarian- and Romanian-speakers, with an established net-
work of schools teaching through the medium of their languages.29
As one of the most linguistically separate communities in Ukraine, the Hun-
garian minority is particularly affected by the new policies. According to the 
last census, held in 2001, 156,000 Hungarians lived in Ukraine, concentrated in 
the Western part of the country, in Zakarpatya Oblast (Transcarpathia), on the 
border with Hungary. Almost half the Hungarians in Ukraine live in practically 
monolingual Hungarian communities, and an additional 28 per cent live in 
settlements where they constitute an absolute or relative majority.30 Since 
27 István Csernicskó and Viktória Ferenc, “Education as an Ideal Means of Achieving a 
 Nation State in Ukraine” in Jolán Róka (ed.), Concepts & Consequences of Multilingualism 
in Europe (Budapest College of Communication and Business, Budapest, 2010), 329–349.
28 acfc, Fourth Opinion on Ukraine – adopted on 10 March 2017, acfc/OP/iv(2017)002, 
Strasbourg, 5 March 2018, para. 159.
29 Csilla Fedinec and István Csernicskó, “A 2017-es ukrajnai oktatási kerettörvény: a szöveg 
keletkezéstörténete és tartalma” [The 2017 Ukrainian Law on Education: The Text’s His-
tory of Adoption and its Content], 25(3) Regio (2017), 278–300, 281.
30 József Molnár and István D. Molnár, Kárpátalja népessége és magyarsága [Population and 
Hungarians of Transcarpathia] (Association of Hungarian Teachers in Transcarpathia, 
Berehove, 2005), 35.
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2001, their numbers have fallen significantly due to emigration. According to 
one detailed study, in 2017 there were 131,000 Hungarians in Transcarpathia, 
down from the 2001 census.31 Over 75% of Hungarian pupils attend schools 
with Hungarian as the language of instruction.32 The community has a devel-
oped education system encompassing all types of schools, from nurseries to a 
private university, financially supported by the Hungarian government.33
2.2 Article 7 of the Law on Education
Article 7 of the Law on Education declares Ukrainian as the language of in-
struction in the country.34 Other languages besides Ukrainian can be used in 
schools, depending on the communities of speakers. The Law is most generous 
towards indigenous peoples of Ukraine, whose languages can be used in pre-
schools, primary (grades one to four) and secondary schools (grades five to 
twelve). The largest indigenous community in Ukraine is the Crimean Tatars, 
who mainly reside in Crimea, which is currently not under Ukrainian jurisdic-
tion.35 The Crimean Tatars have no schools in the remaining territory of 
Ukraine and thus the Law has only symbolic relevance to them.
The Russian community is the most severely affected by Article 7. The Law 
allows Russian to be used in pre-school and primary school education, but 
from the 5th grade it must be replaced by Ukrainian. Only the Russian lan-
guage and Russian literature can be taught in Russian. If implemented, this 
provision would result in the abolition, and Ukrainization, of 621 Russian lan-
guage schools, where 9.6% of the school population currently studies.36 The 
Law would also forbid Russian-language education in universities.
31 “Hány magyar van Kárpátalján?” [How many Hungarians are there in Transcarpathia?], 
Kárpátalja, 14 June 2018, at <https://www.karpataljalap.net/2018/06/14/hany-magyar-van 
-karpataljan>.
32 Com. Ex. ecrml, Third Periodic Report of Ukraine on Implementation of the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, MIN-LANG (2016) PR 1, Strasbourg, 12 Janu-
ary 2016, 193–194.
33 Primary schools are funded from the Ukrainian state budget, receiving additional finan-
cial support from Hungary; the university is funded entirely from Hungarian sources.
34 Article 7(1) of the Law on Education, op. cit., note 4.
35 Bill Bowring, “Who Are the ‘Crimean People’ or ‘People of Crimea’? The Fate of the Crime-
an Tatars, Russia’s Legal Justification for Annexation, and Pandora’s Box”, in Sergey Say-
apin and Evhen Tsybulenko (eds.), The Use of Force Against Ukraine and International 
Law: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello, Jus Post Bellum (The Hague, Asser Press /Springer, 2018) 
21–40.
36 Com. Ex. ecrml, Third Periodic Report of Ukraine on Implementation of the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, MIN-LANG (2016) PR 1, Strasbourg, 12 Janu-
ary 2016, 193–194.
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National minorities whose language is an official EU language represent a 
middle category between the above two.37 Their languages can be used as me-
dium of instruction up until grade four. From grade five, one or more disci-
plines can be taught in official EU languages alongside Ukrainian. This excep-
tion related to EU languages was inserted into the Law before the final vote to 
appease domestic national minorities whose kin-states are EU member states.
2.3 International Reactions to the Law on Education in 2017
Article 7 of the Law on Education was met with strong criticism from some of 
Ukraine’s neighbouring countries. These states, which are kin-states for their 
co-ethnic minorities in Ukraine, include Hungary, Romania, Russia, Poland, 
Moldova, as well as Greece and Bulgaria.38 They protested, stating that  Article 7 
diminishes the rights of minorities in Ukraine to have an education in their 
mother tongue.39
Ukraine initiated diplomatic consultations with the affected countries and 
some of them withdrew from their initial critical position. Diplomatic agree-
ments were reached with Poland40 and Bulgaria,41 which stated that the Law 
on Education was to be implemented in consultation with these countries and 
the affected communities. The agreement with Poland also specified how the 
Law is to be interpreted with regard to education in Polish: in secondary 
schools, 60% of the curriculum will be taught in Ukrainian, and 40% in Pol-
ish.42 Romania strongly protested initially, adopting a parliamentary resolu-
tion expressing deep concerns about the Law, and even cancelling a presiden-
tial visit to Ukraine in October 2017,43 but then started negotiations on the 
37 This in practice includes all national minorities except Russians, placing Russians in a 
separate category of their own.
38 Daborowski, op. cit., note 7, 2.
39 Alya Shandra, “Ukraine’s New Education Law Unleashes International Storm over Minor-
ity Language Status”, EuroMaidan Press, 19 September 2017, at <http://euromaidanpress 
.com/2017/09/19/ukraines-new-education-law-causes-international-storm-over-minori-
ty-language-status/>.
40 “Poland and Ukraine Reach Agreement on Language of Education for National Minori-
ties”, uawire, 24 October 2017, at <https://uawire.org/poland-and-ukraine-reach-agree 
ment-on-language-of-education-for-national-minorities>.
41 “Ukraine, Bulgaria Agree on Language Provisions of Education Law”, unian, 26 April 
2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10096481-ukraine-bulgaria-agree-on-language-
provisions-of-education-law.html>.
42 “Ukraine, Poland to Sign Declaration Implementing Language Clause of Education Law”, 
Interfax Ukraine, 18 October 2017, at <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/455691 
.html>.
43 Alya Shandra, “Experts Weigh in on Ukraine’s Hotly Debated New Minority Language Pol-
icy”, EuroMaidan Press, 29 September 2017, at <http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/09/29/
is-the-international-tempest-over-language-in-ukraines-education-law-justified/>.
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Law’s implementation.44 To date no agreements have been formalized in the 
shape of international treaties which would be binding upon Ukraine.
Hungary’s reaction was the harshest of all the affected countries. On 20 Sep-
tember 2017, the Hungarian National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolu-
tion condemning the Ukrainian law.45 On 26 September, the Hungarian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs declared that the country would block Ukraine’s accession 
process to the EU and nato unless the Law was repealed.46 This uncompro-
mising stance was met with criticism both from Ukraine and international 
commentators, accusing Hungary of furthering Russia’s interests by jeopardiz-
ing Ukraine’s cooperation with nato, and pursuing its own imperialistic goals 
by exercising control over the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and the territory 
where its members reside.47
The conflict became even more a matter of international concern when, on 
12 October 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (pace) 
adopted a resolution criticizing Ukraine for the Law on Education’s effect on 
education in minority languages.48 It recommended that Ukraine modify the 
Law on Education by fully implementing the forthcoming recommendations 
of the Venice Commission.49
2.4 The Venice Commission’s Opinion
The Venice Commission’s opinion on the Law was of particular importance in 
the conflict, and so deserves special attention in this analysis. Ukraine request-
ed the Venice Commission to prepare an opinion on the Law on 29 September 
2017, shortly after it was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada and the relationships 
with neighbouring countries became strained. The Commission delivered its 
opinion on 11 December 2017.50 It acknowledged that promoting the state 
44 “Ukraine, Romania Agree to Seek Compromise on Education Law”, unian, 13 April 2018, 
at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10079624-ukraine-romania-agree-to-seek-compro-
mise-on-education-law.html>.
45 Parliament of Ukraine, 14/2017. (ix. 20.) ogy határozat a jogtipró ukrán oktatási törvény 
elítéléséről és az ellene való fellépésről [Parliamentary resolution on the condemnation 
and steps against the Ukrainian Law on Education], 26 September 2017, Hungary.
46 “Hungary Pledges ‘to Deal a Painful Blow’ to Ukraine’s Future”, LB.ua, 26 September 2017, 
at <https://en.lb.ua/news/2017/09/26/4575_hungary_pledges_to_deal_painful.html>.
47 Chris Harris, “Hungary’s Language Row with Ukraine is about ‘sucking up to Russia’”, Eu-
ronews, 19 February 2018, at <https://www.euronews.com/2018/02/19/hungary-s-language 
-row-with-ukraine-is-about-sucking-up-to-russia->.
48 pace, Resolution 2189(2017) The New Ukrainian Law on Education: A Major Impediment to 
the Teaching of National Minorities’ Mother Tongues, 12 October 2017.
49 Ibid., para. 15.
50 Venice Commission, Ukraine – Opinion no. 902/2017 on the Provisions of the Law on Edu-
cation of 5 September 2017, cdl-AD(2017)030, 11 December 2017.
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 language represented a legitimate interest, but stated that criticism of the 
Ukrainian government over the means chosen to do so was justified.51 The 
Commission was critical of the lack of consultation with minority communi-
ties, the lack of guarantees in the Law and its problematic wording, which gives 
wide scope for limiting education in minority languages.52 It considered the 
restrictions placed on the Russian language discriminatory and recommended 
amending Article 7.53 With regard to national minority languages, the Com-
mission considered the amendment of the Law an appropriate solution.54 Nev-
ertheless, it suggested that many of the concerns could also be immediately 
addressed by implementing legislation which would ensure a sufficient level 
of teaching in minority languages and, at the same time, improve the quality of 
teaching of the state language.55 Although the Venice Commission did not 
specify what would constitute a ‘sufficient level’ of teaching in minority lan-
guages, it was made clear that the Law must address the concerns expressed in 
the opinion.
On 18 February 2018, Ukraine adopted a document outlining its position on 
implementing the Venice Commission’s opinion.56 It does not entertain the 
possibility of amending the Law on Education. Rather, Ukraine decided to im-
plement it through another law on secondary education to be adopted in 2019, 
which will divide different linguistic communities into different categories. 
Indigenous groups will have the most generous options for mother tongue ed-
ucation and could be taught in their mother tongue for up to 90% of teaching 
time.57 Minority communities with an EU official language will be taught in 
their languages 60 to 80% of teaching time at lower secondary schools, and up 
to 40% in upper secondary schools.58 The remaining minority languages will 
be taught in their language up to 20% of the time.59
The document confirms that Ukraine is in fact aiming to limit education in 
minority languages. Taken out of context, 80% of teaching in Romanian might 
sound generous, but it is certainly less than it is currently, when all subjects are 
51 Ibid., para. 119–120.
52 Ibid., para. 120
53 Ibid., para. 124.
54 Ibid., para. 125.
55 Ibid., para. 126.
56 Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Roadmap for Implementation of the Arti-
cle 7 “Language of Education” of the Law of Ukraine “on Education”, 14 February 2018, at 
<https://mon.gov.ua/storage/app/media/news/Новини/2018/02/13/broshure-road 
mapeng12-02-2018-1.pdf>.
57 Ibid., Annex 1, para. 6.
58 Ibid., Annex 1, para. 7.
59 Ibid.
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taught in Romanian except the Ukrainian language. Another document issued 
by the Ukrainian government also confirms that the state is aware that the re-
duction will be detrimental to minority cultures. It justifies its current offer for 
indigenous groups based on the fact that their cultures are in particular need 
of protection, since they only exist in Ukraine and do not have a kin-state.60 
That is true, but it follows that the government is aware that a less generous 
language regime will be limiting other communities’ options for preserving 
their culture – a solution justified in the eyes of the government by the fact 
that these cultures are present elsewhere and thus their shrinking or disap-
pearance in Ukraine is not of concern.
3 Developments in 2018
3.1 International Bodies’ Reactions to the Law on Education
On 5 March 2018, the Council of Europe (CoE) published the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori-
ties’ (hereinafter acfc or Advisory Committee) Fourth Opinion on Ukraine.61 
Although it covered an earlier period, which did not take into account devel-
opments described in this article, it was quite critical of (what was then) the 
draft Law on Education. The acfc noted that the draft limits education in mi-
nority languages, lowers the guarantees provided to them, and is therefore not 
compatible with Article 14 of the Framework Convention.62 The acfc was also 
critical of the poor quality of teaching of the Ukrainian language in minority 
language schools,63 and the lack of accommodation of minority students in 
school-leaving examinations.64
The Committee of Experts on the European Charter for Regional or Minor-
ity Languages (hereinafter Com. Ex. ecrml or Committee of Experts) adopted 
its Third Report on Ukraine on 24 March 2017, but published it only in Decem-
ber 2018.65 The Report does not consider the draft Law on Education, but is 
60 Position of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Regarding the Opinion of 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the 
 Provisions of the Law on Education of 5 September 2017, cdl-AD (2017) 030, 11 December 
2017.
61 acfc, op. cit., note 28.
62 Ibid., para. 160.
63 Ibid., para. 157.
64 Ibid., para. 159.
65 Com. Ex. ecrml, 3rd Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Char-
ter in Ukraine, CM(2017)97, Strasbourg, 24 March 2017.
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critical of the authorities for not taking proactive steps to ensure education in 
minority languages. It urged the Ukrainian authorities to develop a compre-
hensive policy on minority language education.66
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (ohchr) contin-
ues to monitor the human rights situation in Ukraine. Its December 2017 report 
contained an analysis of the Law on Education, and concluded that it was 
more restrictive than the previous education law, ran contrary to Ukraine’s in-
ternational obligations, discriminated against minority communities, and may 
result in increased tensions.67 In its March 2018 report, the ohchr cited the 
Venice Commission’s opinion on the Law on Education, noting that it reflects 
concerns previously raised by ohchr.68 The EU also monitors human rights 
developments in Ukraine. On 9 July, the 20th EU-Ukraine summit took place in 
Brussels, reviewing Ukraine’s integration efforts. The joint statement empha-
sized the need to respect minority rights already exercised in Ukraine under 
relevant international conventions, and to implement the Venice Commis-
sion’s recommendations.69
3.2 Diplomatic Tensions between Hungary and Ukraine
Ukraine is currently in the process of implementing the Venice Commission’s 
recommendations. At the same time, it remains in an open dispute with Hun-
gary, which is blocking Ukraine’s integration with nato and the EU until the 
Law is amended in a way that the Hungarian government considers to respect 
the right to education in minority communities’ mother tongues.
On 14 February 2018, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education invited represen-
tatives of the Transcarpathian Hungarian community to discuss the Law on 
Education. Before the meeting, it transpired that the ministry wished to dis-
cuss the implementation of the Law through the law on secondary education 
further limiting education in minority languages, and thus ignoring the recom-
mendations of the Venice Commission.70 Representatives of the Hungarian 
community declared that unacceptable and boycotted the meeting in protest.
66 Ibid., paras. 18–19.
67 Office of the unhchr, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 
November 2017, 12 December 2017, paras. 155–160.
68 Office of the unhchr, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 
2017 to 15 February 2018, 19 March 2018, para. 136.
69 Joint statement following the 20th EU-Ukraine Summit, Brussels, 9 July 2018, at <https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36086/joint-statement-eu-ua-summit-2018.pdf>.
70 Pallagi Marianna, “Miniszteri csúsztatás vagy provokáció? A kárpátaljai magyar szerve-
zetek nyilatkozata az elmaradt miniszteri találkozó kapcsán” [Ministerial untruth or 
provocation? Statement of Transcarpathian Hungarian organizations on the missed 
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Hungary blocked the meeting of the nato-Ukraine Commission at the min-
isterial level in February,71 and April 2018.72 Since Hungary was alone in its po-
sition, it received criticism from other nato members, which considered the 
issue of minority rights to be outside nato’s remit.73 In May, Poland called on 
nato to intervene in the Hungarian-Ukrainian conflict.74 Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg called upon the two parties to find a solution through negotia-
tion, reconciling the protection of minority rights and Ukraine’s goal of pro-
moting its national language.75 The US also intervened in the same vein.76
The parties finally met on 22 June in Uzhhorod, Ukraine, represented by 
ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of education. It became clear they 
had a very different perception of the goals and results of the meeting. The 
Ukrainian side considered it a breakthrough in bilateral relations, and a sign 
that Hungary had finally accepted the Law on Education and was now willing 
to negotiate its implementation.77 On the other hand, the Hungarian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs declared that the Law was still unacceptable to Hungary, and 
that it would continue to block Ukraine’s integration efforts until the Venice 
 ministerial meeting], Kárpátalja.ma, 15 February 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/
karpatalja/nezopont/miniszteri-csusztatas-vagy-provokacio-a-karpataljai-magyar-
szervezetek-nyilatkozata-az-elmaradt-miniszteri-talalkozo-kapcsan/>.
71 “Hungary Once Again Blocking Ukraine-nato Commission”, unian, 23 April 2018, at 
<https://www.unian.info/politics/10091873-hungary-once-again-blocking-ukraine-nato 
-commission.html>.
72 “Ambassador: Meeting of UA-nato Commission ‘depends on Hungary and the whole 
 Alliance”, unian, 27 April 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10098083-ambassa-
dor-meeting-of-ua-nato-commission-depends-on-hungary-and-the-whole-alliance 
.html>.
73 “Lithuania and Canada Oppose Hungarian Initiative to Revise nato’s Cooperation 
with Ukraine”, uawire, 27 May 2018, at <https://www.uawire.org/lithuania-and-canada 
-opposed-the-hungarian-initiative-to-revise-nato-s-cooperation-with-ukraine>.
74 “Polish FM Calls on nato’s Stoltenberg to Intervene in Hungary-Ukraine Row”, unian, 27 
May 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10132220-polish-fm-calls-on-nato-s-stol 
tenberg-to-intervene-in-hungary-ukraine-row.html>.
75 “Stoltenberg Hopes Ukraine, Hungary Able to Find Solution in Language Row”, unian, 29 
May 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10133093-stoltenberg-hopes-ukraine-hun-
gary-able-to-find-solution-in-language-row.html>.
76 “Szijjarto Hails U.S. Role in Efforts to Settle Hungary-Ukraine Language Row”, unian, 31 
May 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10136486-szijjarto-hails-u-s-role-in-efforts-
to-settle-hungary-ukraine-language-row.html>.
77 “A magyar–ukrán miniszteri találkozó médiavisszhangja” [Media reactions to the Hun-
garian-Ukrainian ministerial meeting], Kárpátalja, 23 June 2018, at <www.karpataljalap 
.net/?q=2018/06/23/pozitiv-magyar-ukran-kormanykozi-munkacsoport-talalkozojanak- 
ukran-visszhangja>.
 Please check the unpaired quotation mark in this sentence “depends on Hungary…”.
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Commission’s recommendations were implemented.78 He also mentioned 
three specific conditions which Ukraine should meet in order for negotiations 
to continue: limiting the Law’s scope so that it does not affect private schools, 
prolonging the time period up to 2023 for the linguistic requirements to enter 
into force, and beginning negotiations with the affected minority communities 
about their education needs. The Ukrainian delegates agreed to these 
conditions,79 but whether the government is in a position to implement them 
remains doubtful. The first two require amending the Law, which is within the 
remit of members of parliament. As the three conditions had not been met, 
Hungary continued to block meetings of the nato–Ukraine Commission, but 
did not object to President Poroshenko’s attendance at the following nato 
summit, which took place on 11 and 12 July.80 The Summit’s Declaration urged 
Ukraine “to fully implement the recommendations and conclusions of the 
Opinion of the Venice Commission”.81
On 11 July, the Ukrainian authorities held a meeting with representatives of 
Hungarians from Transcarpathia to implement the Venice Commission’s re-
quirement of negotiating with the affected minorities.82 They did not achieve a 
breakthrough. The Hungarian side wanted to discuss the implementation of the 
Venice Commission’s recommendations, while the Ukrainian side considered 
the Law on Education unchangeable and wanted to discuss  implementing 
78 Tóth Tünde, “Az oktatási törvényről folytatott tárgyalás eredményei” [Results of the nego-
tiations over the Law on Education], Kárpátalja.ma, 22 June 2018, at <http://www.karpa-
talja.ma/karpatalja/oktatas/az-oktatasi-torvenyrol-folytatott-targyalas-eredmenyei/>.
79 Molnár Krisztina, “Klimkin: Magyarországon kezdik érteni, hogy Ukrajna nem akarja 
 diszkriminálni a magyar kisebbséget” [Klimkin: They start to understand in Hungary 
that Ukraine does not want to discriminate the Hungarian minority], Kárpátalja.ma, 28 
June 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/nezopont/klimkin-magyarorszagon 
-kezdik-erteni-hogy-ukrajna-nem-akarja-diszkriminalni-a-magyar-kisebbseget/>.
80 “Hungary Agrees to Ukraine’s Participation in nato Summit, but Keeps Blocking Bilateral 
Commission”, unian, 22 June 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10162691-hungary 
-agrees-to-ukraine-s-participation-in-nato-summit-but-keeps-blocking-bilateral-com-
mission.html>.
81 Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–12 July 2018, nato Press 
 Release, 11 July 2018, para. 66, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts 
_156624.htm>.
82 Pallagi Marianna, “Újabb magyar–ukrán tárgyalás Kijevben lényeges fejlemények nélkül” 
[Another Hungarian-Ukrainian meeting in Kyiv without important developments], Kár-
pátalja.ma, 11 July 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/ujabb-magyar 
-ukran-targyalas-kijevben-lenyeges-fejlemenyek-nelkul/>.
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legislation on secondary education.83 As the latter explained, the implement-
ing law would have to be adopted within the general framework of the Law on 
Education, accepting the limitations on minority languages.84
3.3 Deterioration of Bilateral Relations and Anti-minority Incidents
Coinciding with the gradual worsening of Hungarian-Ukrainian bilateral rela-
tions, incidents against Hungarian interests intensified in Ukraine. From the 
beginning of the year, local media reported several anti-Hungarian hate crimes 
in Transcarpathia, such as the vandalizing of Hungarian signs, cars with Hun-
garian license plates, and extremist anti-Hungarian rallies.85 The most serious 
were an arson and later a bomb attack against the Transcarpathian Hungarian 
Cultural Association’s headquarters in Uzhhorod. Some media investigations 
have suggested that Russian agents, exploiting the conflict, were behind some 
of these attacks.86
In June 2018, the Ukrainian security agency initiated criminal proceedings 
for separatism against a Hungarian development organization disbursing 
funds from Hungary.87 In the same month, Transcarpathia’s football team won 
the conifa World Cup, a tournament for regions and peoples not officially 
recognized as fifa members. The Ukrainian authorities declared this an act of 
separatism, and threatened team members with penalties.88 In August, 
Ukraine declared persona non-grata István Grezsa, a newly re-appointed Hun-
garian ministerial commissioner for the development of Transcarpathia;89 the 
83 Pallagi Marianna, “Megjegyzések a kijevi találkozó kapcsán” [Comments on the meeting 
in Kyiv], Kárpátalja.ma, 12 July 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/nezopont/
megjegyzesek-a-kijevi-talalkozo-kapcsan/>.
84 Pallagi, op.cit., note 82.
85 Dunda György, “Magyarellenes incidensek Kárpátalján” [Anti-Hungarian incidents in 
Transcarpathia], Magyar idők, 19 March 2018, at <https://magyaridok.hu/kulfold/
magyarellenes-incidensek-karpataljan-2904036/>.
86 Szabolcs Panyi, Anastasiia Moroz, and Konrad Szczygieł, “Western Ukraine Burning. How 
Russia Sets Fire to the EU’s External Border”, Vsquare.org, 27 June 2018, at <https://vsquare.org/
zakarpattia-western-ukraine-burning-how-russia-sets-fire-to-the-eus-external-border/>.
87 mti, “Szeparatizmus gyanújával indított büntetőeljárást az Egán Ede kárpátaljai ala-
pítvány ellen az szbu” [sbu started criminal proceedings against the Transcarpathian 
Ede Egán Foundation with suspicion of separatism], Webrádió, 5 June 2018, at <https:// 
webradio.hu/hirek/kulfold/szeparatizmus-gyanujaval-inditott-buntetoeljarast-az-egan 
-ede-karpataljai-alapitvany-ellen-az-szbu>.
88 Ráti József, “Balhéznak az ukránok a kárpátaljai világbajnokok miatt” [Ukrainian row over 
Transcarpathian world champions], Index, 12 June 2018, at <https://index.hu/sport/ 
futball/2018/06/12/ukrajna_karpatalja_vilagbajnok_szeparatizmus/>.
89 mti, “Ukrajna ellenséget lát abban, akitől a segítséget kapja” [Ukraine sees an enemy 
from whom it receives help], Kárpátinfo.net, 3 August 2018, at <https://www.karpatinfo. 
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Ukrainian government considered his title an interference in Ukraine’s domes-
tic affairs. In September, Ukraine expelled the Hungarian consul in Berehove 
for giving out Hungarian citizenship to applicants in the region.90 The latter 
step was surprising because Hungary had been openly granting citizenship to 
Hungarians in Transcarpathia since 2010. Hungary reacted by expelling a 
Ukrainian consul from Hungary.91 Transcarpathian-Hungarian public officials 
and activists complained of harassment by the authorities, which held them 
up for up to eight hours at border crossing points with no reasons given.92 The 
website Mirotvorec published 500 names of alleged Hungarian–Ukrainian 
double-agents, referred to as enemies of the nation, with their personal data.93 
The authorities declined to intervene,94 yet took steps to investigate whether 
those persons on the list had violated any Ukrainian laws.95 A citizens’ petition 
also appeared on the website of the Verkhovna Rada, collecting signatures for 
the deportation of Hungarians from Ukraine.96 Lastly, in October, billboards 
net/cikk/kulfold/200007652-miniszterelnokseg-ukrajna-ellenseget-lat-abban-akitol 
-segitseget-kapja>.
90 mti, “Kiutasíthatják Ukrajnából a beregszászi magyar konzult” [The Hungarian consul in 
Berehove may be expelled from Ukraine], hvg, 20 September 2018, at <https://hvg.hu/
vilag/20180920_kiutasithatjak_ukrajnabol_a_beregszaszi_magyar_konzult>.
91 Lovas Gergő, “Az ukrán külügy nemkívánatos személlyé nyilvánította a beregszászi mag-
yar konzult” [The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the Hungarian consul 
in Berehove persona non grata], Index.hu, 4 October 2018, at <https://index.hu/kulfold/ 
2018/10/04/az_ukran_kulugy_nemkivanatos_szemellye_nyilvanitotta_a_beregszaszi 
_magyar_konzult/>.
92 Pallagi Marianna, “Kilencórás várakoztatás az ukrán határátkelőkön – folytatódik a kár-
pátaljai magyarság elleni hadviselés” [Nine hour hold-up at Ukrainian border crossings – 
the warfare against Transcarpathian Hungarians continues], Kárpátalja.ma, 21 Sep-
tember 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/kilencoras-varakoztatas 
-az-ukran-hataratkelokon-folytatodik-a-karpataljai-magyarsag-elleni-hadviseles/>.
93 Iván András, “Az ukrán nacionalisták azt állítják, orosz titkosszolgálatoktól lopták a 
magyar útlevelek adatbázisát” [Ukrainian nationalists claim that they stole database of 
Hungarian passports from Russian Secret Services], Index.hu, 11 October 2018, at <https://
index.hu/kulfold/2018/10/11/az_ukran_nacionalistak_azt_allitjak_orosz_titkosszolgala 
toktol_loptak_a_magyar_utlevelek_adatbazisat/>.
94 mti, “Kijev szerint hamarosan megegyezés születik a nyelvtörvényről” [According to Kyiv 
soon there will be an agreement about the language law], Origo, 15 October 2018, at 
<https://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20181015-klimkin-kijev-nem-akarja-asszimilalni-a 
-karpataljai-magyarokat.html>.
95 Thüringer Barbara, “Több száz tisztviselőt világítanak át Kárpátalján, hogy kettős álla-
mpolgárok-e” [Several hundred officials will be vetted in Transcarpathia for dual citi-
zenship], Index.hu, 9 October 2018, at <https://index.hu/kulfold/2018/10/09/karpatalja 
_magyar_allampolgarsag_atvilagitas/>.
96 Mondik Márta, “Még mindig nincs uniós válasz a kárpátaljai magyarok elleni soroza-
tos jogsértésekre” [There is still no response from the Union on the continuous viola-
tion of the rights of Transcarpathian Hungarians], Kárpátalja.ma, 23 October 2018, at 
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appeared around Transcarpathia, calling some representatives of the Hungar-
ian community traitors and separatists.97 The Ukrainian authorities initiated 
criminal proceedings for the latter incident.98
The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his concerns about 
these incidents in September99 and the parties agreed on negotiations to re-
solve some of the existing disputes. They found a solution to the question of 
the Hungarian commissioner by changing his title to make it more acceptable 
to the Ukrainian side.100 They also agreed to hold a consular meeting specifi-
cally on the question of dual citizenship.101 On 24 October, on a meeting of the 
two ministers of foreign affairs, Hungary proposed a bilateral treaty on minor-
ity protection.102 In November, Ukraine granted the acceptance letter to the 




97 mti, “Magyarellenes óriásplakátok jelentek meg Kárpátalján” [Anti-Hungarian billboards 
appeared in Transcarpathia], Origo, 20 October 2018, at <https://www.origo.hu/
nagyvilag/20181020-magyarellenes-oriasplakatok-jelentek-meg-karpataljan.html>.
98 mti, “Magyarázkodnak az ukrán hatóságok a magyarellenes plakátok miatt” [Ukrainian 
authorities explain anti-Hungarian billboards], Origo, 22 October 2018, at <https://www 
.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20181022-nemzetisegi-viszaly-szitasa-miatt-indul-eljaras-karpataljan 
-a-magyarellenes-oriasplakatok-ugyeben.html>.
99 mti, “Kijev szerint Budapest a Moszkvával folyó tárgyalásain próbál hasznot húzni az 
‘útlevélbotrányból’” [According to Kyiv, Budapest tries to take advantage of the ‘passport-
scandal’ in its negotiations with Moscow], Kárpátinfo.net, 23 September 2018, at <https://
www.karpatinfo.net/cikk/belfold/200011003-kijev-szerint-budapest-moszkvaval-folyo 
-targyalasain-probal-hasznot-huzni-az-utlevelbotranybol>.
100 The new title is “Ministerial Commissioner responsible for the development of coopera-
tion between Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county and Transcarpathia and the coordination 
of the program on development of childcare facilities in the Carpathian basin”; Kocsis 
Julianna, “Módosították Grezsa István titulusát” [István Grezsa’s title was modified], Kár-
pátalja.ma, 30 October 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/kitekinto/magyarorszag/
modositottak-grezsa-istvan-titulusat/>.
101 “Kijev nem vitázik Magyarországgal az ukrán törvények értelmezéséről” [Kyiv does not 
argue with Hungary about the interpretation of Ukrainian laws], Karpatinfo.net, 26 No-
vember 2018, at <https://www.karpatinfo.net/cikk/belfold/200014820-kijev-nem-vitazik-
magyarorszaggal-az-ukran-torvenyek-ertelmezeserol>.
102 mti, “Magyarország kisebbségvédelmi egyezmény megkötését javasolta Ukrajnának” 
[Hungary proposed to Ukraine to conclude a treaty on minority protection], Origo, 24 
October 2018, at <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20181024-kisebbsegvedelmi-egyezmyt 
-kotne-magyarorszag-ukrajnaval.html>.
103 mti, “Megkapta a befogadó nyilatkozatot az új kijevi magyar nagykövet”, Mandiner, 8 No-
vember 2018, at <https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20181108_megkapta_a_befogado_nyilatkozatot 
_az_uj_kijevi_magyar_nagykovet>.
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After a difficult period, bilateral relations seemed to normalize. After the 
Kerch Strait incident of 25 November, when Russian coast guard boats fired at 
and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels, Hungary declared its full support 
for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.104 However, normalization 
did not resolve the dispute over the Law on Education. Hungary declared that 
it would continue to block meetings of the nato-Ukraine Commission in De-
cember, while not opposing the participation of Ukraine in the meeting of 
nato Ministers of Foreign Affairs.105 At the meeting itself, the Hungarian min-
ister explained that Hungary had been under a lot of pressure to modify their 
position, but they would only do so if Ukraine restored the linguistic rights of 
its minority communities.106
3.4 Adoption of the New Language Law
Although overshadowed by discussions concerning the Law on Education, an-
other important issue affecting minority rights in Ukraine developed in 2018. 
On 28 February 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared unconstitu-
tional the 2012 Language Law107 for procedural reasons related to its adop-
tion.108 This law regulated the use of languages at the local and regional levels 
and its abolition resulted in a legal vacuum.109
The government reacted to the ruling on unconstitutionality with a bill for 
a new language law, which was adopted at its first reading by the Verkhovna 
104 mti, “Szijjártó: Magyarország kiáll Ukrajna területi integritása és szuverenitása mellett” 
[Szijjártó: Hungary supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty], Kárpátinfo.
net, 28 November 2018, at <https://www.karpatinfo.net/cikk/kulfold/200014923-szijjarto 
-magyarorszag-kiall-ukrajna-teruleti-integritasa-es-szuverenitasa-mellett>.
105 mti, “Szijjártó: Magyarország továbbra is blokkolja a nato-Ukrajna Bizottság ülését” 
[Szijjártó: Hungary continues to block meetings of the nato-Ukraine Commission], Kár-
pátinfo.net, 20 November 2018, at <https://www.karpatinfo.net/cikk/kulfold/200014468 
-szijjarto-magyarorszag-tovabbra-blokkolja-nato-ukrajna-bizottsag-uleset>.
106 mti, “Magyarország figyeli Ukrajna kisebbségeket érintő politikáját” [Hungary pays 
attention to Ukraine’s policies affecting minorities], Hirado.hu, 5 December 2018, at 
<https://www.hirado.hu/kulfold/kulpolitika/cikk/2018/12/04/magyarorszag-figyelemmel 
-koveti-ukrajna-kisebbsegeket-erinto-politikajat/>.
107 Закон України “Про засади державної мовної політики” [Law of Ukraine “On the 
Principles of State Language Policy”], No. 5029-vi., 03 July 2012.
108 Office of the unhchr, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 February to 
15 May 2018, 20 June 2018, para. 85.
109 “Brenzovics László: A kárpátaljai magyarság hathatósabb fellépést vár az ebesz-től” 
[László Brenzovics: Transcarpathian Hungarians expect more powerful action from osce], 
Kárpátalja.ma, 11 September 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/nezopont/
brenzovics-laszlo-a-karpataljai-magyarsag-hathatosabb-fellepest-var-az-ebesz-tol/>.
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Rada on 4 October.110 However, this bill only regulated the use of the state lan-
guage, and therefore leaves minority languages in a state of legal uncertainty.111 
According to an analysis by the UN Human Rights Mission in Ukraine, the pro-
posed law raises serious concerns about its compatibility with international 
human rights standards, and does not offer a balanced framework to protect 
minority languages.112 Representatives of several minority communities ex-
pressed concerns on the draft law,113 as did the Hungarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs114 and 19 Members of the European Parliament in an open letter.115 The 
EU asked Ukraine to request the Venice Commission for an opinion on the 
draft law.116
4 Assessment of the Law on Education under the fcnm and the 
ecrml
As detailed above, several international bodies have criticized the Law on Edu-
cation during the period analysed. However, the acfc and the Com. Ex. 
ecrml, the treaty bodies of the two most relevant instruments, have not yet 
110 Bill 5670-д, Закон України “Про забезпечення функціонування української 
мови як державної” [Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the 
State language”]; an English translation of the law was not available at the time of writing 
this article.
111 Pallagi Marianna, “Tényleg van-e új nyelvtörvény?” [Is there really a new language law?], 
Kárpátalja.ma, 5 October 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/nezopont/
tenyleg-van-e-uj-nyelvtorveny/>.
112 Office of the unhchr, Briefing Note on the Draft Law ‘On Ensuring the Functioning of 
Ukrainian as the State language’, 9 November 2018.
113 Pallagi Marianna, “Az ukrajnai kisebbségek oktatási helyzete került terítékre Brüsszel-
ben” [Education of Ukrainian minorities was discussed in Brussels], Kárpátalja.
ma, 2 December 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/oktatas/az-ukrajnai 
-kisebbsegek-oktatasi-helyzete-kerult-teritekre-brusszelben/>.
114 kkm, “Jelentősen romlott a helyezet Ukrajna vonatkozásában” [The situation with 
regard to Ukraine has worsened significantly], Magyar Idők, 25 October 2018, at 
<https://magyaridok.hu/kulfold/szijjarto-peter-jelentosen-romlott-a-helyzet-ukrajna 
-vonatkozasaban-3608039/>.
115 mti, “EP-képviselők egy csoportja nyílt levélben tiltakozott a tervezett ukrán nyelvtörvé-
ny ellen” [Group of meps protests the planned Ukrainian language law in an open letter], 
Kárpátinfo.net, 27 October 2018, at <https://www.karpatinfo.net/cikk/kulfold/200013105 
-ep-kepviselok-egy-csoportja-nyilt-levelben-tiltakozott-tervezett-ukran-nyelvtorveny 
-ellen>.
116 “EU Asks Ukraine to Submit Draft of the ‘Language’ Law for Final Review by Venice Com-
mission”, uawire, 13 October 2018, at <https://www.uawire.org/the-european-union 
-asks-ukraine-to-submit-a-draft-of-the-language-law-to-the-venice-commission#>.
0004546004.INDD   251 27-11-2019   07:45:45 PM
Fiala-Butora252
204248
had the chance to comment on it. Therefore, it is an open question as to wheth-
er the Law complies with or violates international treaties on national minori-
ties and minority languages. The following analysis will address this issue.
The linguistic requirements of the Law on Education are quite vague when 
it comes to languages of national minorities. The Law stipulates that “one or 
more” classes per week can be taught in a minority language, which can range 
from one class to “every class but Ukrainian language and literature”, which is 
the current situation. Details are to be set in specific laws regulating education 
on pre-school, primary-school and secondary-school levels. However, even in 
its current uncertain form, the Law falls below Ukraine’s obligations under 
 European treaties protecting minority rights and languages. This can be con-
firmed by examining how Ukraine’s current policy on education in minority 
languages was assessed under the treaties.
The fcnm regulates minority language education in Article 14(2). It requires 
that persons belonging to minorities be taught the minority language or re-
ceive instruction in the minority language. Similarly, the ecrml allows states 
to select obligations under Article 8(1) to teach minority languages or through 
the medium of such languages, which Ukraine has done. Therefore, the Ukrai-
nian government can argue that its obligations are fulfilled if it provides teach-
ing of minority languages only, without employing them as languages of 
instruction.117
However, the monitoring bodies of both treaties clarified that the choice 
between the two models is not up to the state and that the Law must reflect the 
needs of the specific minorities. As the Com. Ex. ecrml explained, minorities 
with a well-developed education system, such as the Hungarians, Romanians 
and Russians, require education in their mother tongue, which the state should 
provide.118 Similarly, the acfc emphasized that “demand is a key element” in 
Article 14(2) of the fcnm; therefore the state must offer education in minority 
languages for communities which request it.119
The treaty-monitoring bodies found shortcomings under these articles with 
regard to several of the national minority communities that did not benefit 
from sufficient education in their language. The main concerns related to the 
117 When ratifying the ecrml, Ukraine has chosen to apply provisions which allow to offer 
teaching of minority languages and teaching in minority languages alternatively: Article 
8(1) a(iii), b(iv), c(iv) and d(iv).
118 Com. Ex. ecrml, 2nd Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Char-
ter in Ukraine, ecrml(2014) 3, Strasbourg, 15 January 2014, para. 110.
119 acfc, Third Opinion on Ukraine, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities, acfc/OP/iii(2012)002, Strasbourg, 28 March 2013, 
para. 128.
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question of guarantees, as the Law did not specify who has to request, and how 
many requests are necessary, to open a school or class teaching in a minority 
language.120 It has therefore been at the discretion of the domestic regional 
authorities to decide whether to grant a request to six or 15 pupils, or to reject 
it arbitrarily, even if a large number of pupils and their parents requested that 
a school teaching in Romanian be opened.121 The Committee of Ministers em-
phasized that establishing new classes should not be the responsibility of citi-
zens; the authorities must be proactive in mapping the demand of pupils and 
establish classes accordingly.122
The cited opinions of the treaty monitoring bodies were formulated with 
reference to Ukraine’s previous education law adopted in 1991, but they apply 
to the 2017 Law on Education as well. It is clear that the new Law falls below the 
standards of the previous law in terms of linguistic rights.123 The 2017 Law 
guarantees education in minority languages only up to grade four. From grade 
five, minority language education is possible but not guaranteed. Under the 
previous law, education was at least formally guaranteed, although detailed 
guarantees were missing in practice. The 2017 Law further diminished these 
guarantees.
Apart from the issue of legal guarantees, the 2017 Law is also problematic 
from a substantive point of view. Currently, minority language schools teach all 
classes in their minority language except classes on Ukrainian language and 
literature. According to the new law, they will be able to teach “one or more” 
classes in the minority language. This particular formulation suggests a drive 
to limit the range of classes taught in minority languages. Indeed, this is how 
the Ukrainian government interprets it.124 The Law, therefore, means further 
backsliding on minority rights compared to the already criticised status quo.
Several other problems can be identified in Article 7. Education in mi-
nority languages will be possible in separate classes in schools teaching in 
Ukrainian, but the Law does not mention schools with a minority language 
120 Ibid., para. 127.
121 Ibid., para. 113.
122 Ibid., para. 112.
123 acfc, op. cit., note 28, para. 160.
124 Position of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Regarding the Opinion of 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the Pro-
visions of the Law on Education of 5 September 2017 (cdl-AD (2017) 030), 11 December 
2017; see also an analysis of the Ukrainian government’s position in Ivan Toronchuk and 
Volodymyr Markovskyi, “The Implementation of the Venice Commission Recommenda-
tions on the Provision of the Minorities Language Rights in the Ukrainian Legislation”, 
5(1) European Journal of Law and Public Administration (2018), 54–69.
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of  instruction.125 It is unclear what happens to those schools which currently 
only have classes teaching in minority languages. According to Fedinec and 
Csernicskó, these will lose their legal personality and independence, because 
only Ukrainian-language schools can exist as autonomous entities under the 
Law – a reading certainly in line with the Law’s text.126 Similarly, the “one or 
more” classes of minority language instruction can take place alongside in-
struction in Ukrainian, not instead of Ukrainian. The logical reading, adopted 
by Fedinec and Csernicskó, suggests that the classes must in fact be bilingual, 
using both languages, in a way that is yet unclear.127 This might not have been 
the legislators’ intent and it is only a case of unfortunate wording, but the text 
certainly contributes to a lack of legal clarity and further diminishes the guar-
antees of minority language education.
The Ukrainian government justified Article 7 of the Law by arguing that 
many pupils from minority language schools fail to achieve a sufficient com-
mand of Ukrainian, which limits their opportunities for higher education, and 
therefore schools must remedy the situation by teaching the students more 
classes in Ukrainian.128 This justification is both revealing and unsatisfactory. It 
shows that the authorities indeed plan to limit instruction in minority lan-
guages, which is the automatic consequence of teaching more classes in Ukrai-
nian. It also reveals that they consider the choice of language a zero-sum game, 
where the interests of the state and those of minority speakers have to be bal-
anced against each other.
Many speakers of minority languages do indeed have a poor command of 
Ukrainian, and the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all its citizens 
have a sufficient knowledge of the official language. This was accepted by the 
drafters of the fcnm and the ecrml as well.129 Representatives of minority 
communities are themselves not opposed to learning Ukrainian. Quite the con-
trary; for example, the Hungarian community’s representatives have requested 
for decades that the state take measures to improve the teaching of Ukrainian 
in minority schools.130 In fact they complained at the international level that 
the state does not provide language books, dictionaries, sufficiently trained 
125 See Article 7(1) of the Law.
126 Fedinec and Csernicskó, op. cit., note 29, 293.
127 Ibid.
128 “Why Ukraine Needs New Law on Education”, at <http://uaedulaw.com/>.
129 See Article 14(3) of the Framework Convention and Article 8(1) of the Charter.
130 Written Comments by Hungarian Researchers and ngos in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) on 
the Third Periodic Report of Ukraine on the Implementation of the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, Berehove, 11 July 2016, p. 19, at <https://kmksz.com.ua/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Ukraine-Charter-shadow-report-Arnyekjelentes-nyk.pdf>.
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language teachers and an appropriate methodology to achieve this task.131 The 
Association of Hungarian Teachers in Transcarpathia formulated a common 
position for the purposes of negotiations with the ministry of education, which 
stresses the improvement of the teaching of Ukrainian in Hungarian schools as 
the main objective, which the new Law on Education does not address.132
Adequate teaching of Ukrainian requires all the above methods, but it does 
not require teaching classes in Ukrainian apart from Ukrainian language and 
literature. Examples of other countries show that sufficient command of the 
official language can be achieved in minority language schools where the offi-
cial language is taught only as a subject.133 However, the 2017 Ukrainian Law on 
Education provides no guarantees to improve the teaching of Ukrainian, apart 
from increasing the number of subjects taught in it.
Without improvements in the teaching of Ukrainian, pupils from minority 
communities would be doubly disadvantaged. Many of them would fail to 
learn Ukrainian properly, and they would also fail to make progress in the 
courses that are taught in Ukrainian, a language they do not sufficiently under-
stand. The purpose of education is not simply indoctrination in a national cul-
ture, but acquiring knowledge, for which the mother tongue is still the best 
medium.134
For these reasons, the Ukrainian government’s interest in ensuring that all 
citizens speak Ukrainian is certainly legitimate and is an interest that the mi-
nority communities in fact share, but this does not require and does not justify 
limiting education in minority languages. The state has other, more effective 
methods at its disposal to achieve its goal – methods which it has failed to use, 
despite requests from minority communities.
The Ukrainian government also justified its language policies by arguing 
that similar regulations affect the Ukrainian minority in neighbouring coun-
tries. This is incorrect,135 but more importantly, even if it were true, it would 
131 acfc, op. cit., note 28, para. 157.
132 Célok és feladatok az ukrán mint államnyelv oktatásának javítása területén [Goals and 
tasks for improving the teaching of Ukrainian as a state language], Association of Hungar-
ian Teachers in Transcarpathia, 16 December 2017.
133 For example, in Slovakia, pupils in schools with Hungarian as language of instruction 
have a good command of Slovak even though it is only taught as a subject.
134 Stephen May, “Rearticulating the Case for Minority Language Rights”, 4(2) Current Issues 
in Language Planning (2003), 95–125, 117.
135 Slovakia, Romania and Hungary have a system of minority language schools where educa-
tion can take place entirely in minority languages. There are few schools teaching in 
Ukrainian compared to other minority language schools (such as Hungarian-language 
schools in Slovakia and Romania, and German-language schools in Hungary), but the rea-
son for this is the small size of the Ukrainian community, not legal restrictions. 
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not justify violations of Ukraine’s international obligations. There certainly are 
countries which limit minority education rights even more severely than this 
particular Ukrainian law – Latvia’s recent education reform is a case in point.136 
But Latvia’s bad example does not lower international standards; they contin-
ue to apply to Ukraine (and Latvia) in the same way.
5 Conflict Prevention or Human Rights Promotion? – Two Natures of 
the Conflict
The conflict between Hungary and Ukraine is a bilateral diplomatic and secu-
rity conflict. It attracts particular attention because it jeopardized Ukraine’s 
cooperation with nato and thus its vital security interests in the face of Rus-
sia’s illegitimate actions in Ukraine. At the same time, the conflict can also be 
characterised as a disagreement over human rights norms. The main object of 
the dispute from the Hungarian point of view is the Law on Education. Objec-
tions to it are indeed based on international human rights standards relating 
to the right to education of minorities.137
 Nevertheless, Slovakia has schools teaching in Ruthenian (a language closely related to 
Ukrainian), and Romania has schools teaching in Ukrainian. See Com. Ex. ecrml, 4th 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Charter in Slovakia, 
ecrml(2016)2, Strasbourg, 27 April 2016, para. 211; Com. Ex. ecrml, Second report of the 
Committee of Experts in respect of Romania, CM(2018)4, Strasbourg, 7 February 2018, 
para. 107. In Hungary, according to Jaroszlava Hartyanyi, a representative of the Ukrainian 
Minority in the Hungarian Parliament, there are no legal or administrative obstacles to 
teaching in minority languages, and several minority communities do in fact have schools 
teaching in their languages. However, since the Ukrainian community is small and dis-
persed, there are not enough pupils to open a class teaching in Ukrainian; see Kocsis Juli-
anna, “Hartyanyi Jaroszlava: ‘Ha megfelelően képzett nyelvtanárok oktatnák a magyaro-
kat, megtanulnák az államnyelvet’” [Jaroszlava Hartyanyi: “If Hungarians were taught by 
adequately trained language teachers, they would learn the state language”], Karpatalja.
ma, 19 October 2017, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/nezopont/hartyanyi 
-jaroszlava-ha-megfeleloen-kepzett-nyelvtanarok-oktatnak-a-magyarokat-megtanulnak-
az-allamnyelvet/>.
136 “President Promulgates Law Leading to Latvian Language Switch in Schools”, lsm.lv, 
2 April 2018, at <https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/education/president-promulgates-law-
leading-to-latvian-language-switch-in-schools.a273409/>.
137 This is not to say that all actions of the Hungarian government in bilateral conflicts re-
lated to Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries are based on human rights 
norms; see János Fiala-Butora, “Hungarians in Slovakia and the Evolution of Hungarian-
Slovakian Bilateral Relations – Improvement or Stalemate?” 12 eymi (2015), 158–196. Spe-
cifically with regard to Ukraine, the Hungarian government, similarly to other neighbours 
of Ukraine, acts extraterritorially by permitting Transcarpathian Hungarians to obtain 
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Security conflicts and human rights conflicts affecting minorities often 
overlap, and in practice are difficult to separate analytically. In fact, there has 
been a convergence of instruments and bodies dealing with these types of con-
flicts in relation to national minorities in Europe.138 Nevertheless, human 
rights protection and conflict prevention approaches have different goals. If 
the conflict between Hungary and Ukraine were to be understood through the 
lens of security considerations, it would have a simple resolution – the two 
parties involved should come to an agreement over the extent of mother 
tongue education in secondary schools. The result might be less than what 
Hungary demands, but that is the nature of diplomacy – compromises must be 
made on both sides. This is indeed the position of nato and the US, which 
called on Hungary and Ukraine to end their conflict through negotiations.
However, from the perspective of international human rights norms, the is-
sue is not that simple. As the above analysis suggests, the Law is violating the 
right to education of minority communities. Consequently, the conflict cannot 
be resolved without amending the Law and bringing it into compliance with 
international norms. This is true even if Hungary agreed to accept the Law as it 
is, or even if the representatives of minority communities in Ukraine did as 
well. The beneficiaries of human rights norms are individuals. Any person 
from Ukraine might raise a claim that the Law violates their rights. Neither 
their local representatives, nor the Hungarian state can waive this right on 
their behalf. An agreement between Hungary and Ukraine would not bind an 
individual victim or the international bodies reviewing compliance with hu-
man rights treaties.
The evidence suggests that bilateral diplomacy will not be particularly effec-
tive in this case to guarantee the Law’s amendment. Negotiations have in fact 
been attempted, but the parties’ positions diverge too much for a solution to be 
found.139 The Hungarian community in Ukraine, supported by Hungary, can-
not accept the Law on Education, as it runs contrary to its vital interests. The 
Ukrainian government, on the other hand, is not willing to amend the Law, and 
only wishes to discuss its implementation. In this situation, bilateral negotia-
tions cannot achieve the goal of compliance with human rights norms. Rather, 
they can have the opposite result; they could legitimize the Law on Education, 
Hungarian citizenship, and is also supporting Hungarian cultural associations, political 
parties, teachers, and businesses. However, these activities long predate the dispute over 
the Law on Education and cannot be considered one of its causes.
138 Merja Pentikäinen, “Social Integration of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Minorities in Europe in Views of 
International Expert Bodies Relying on Human Rights: Contextual Balancing and Tailor-
ing”, 14(1) Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2015), 26–47.
139 Daborowski, op. cit., note 7.
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which is considered unacceptable by minority communities in Ukraine, and is 
violating international treaties.140
Other states’ negotiations can also serve as a useful reference point about 
the ineffectiveness of the bilateral approach. The agreements with Bulgaria, 
Poland and Romania did not result in an outcome that would be favourable to 
minorities. Indeed, the solution reached by Poland further limits minority 
rights, even compared to the Law on Education.
It is also questionable to what extent the Ukrainian government would be 
bound by any bilateral agreement. If it was later violated by a legislative provi-
sion, what value would the agreement have? The Hungarian-Ukrainian bilat-
eral negotiations of 22 June 2018 can serve as an example. The Ukrainian repre-
sentatives agreed to postpone the Law’s entry into force and to take private 
schools out of its scope, but it is doubtful whether they would be able to pass 
such an amendment in the Verkhovna Rada.
The interests of minority communities would have received more attention 
from the Ukrainian authorities if international bodies responsible for enforc-
ing international human rights norms had put more pressure on the country. 
This has so far not been the case. Ukraine has long ignored the recommenda-
tions of the CoE under the fcnm and the ecrml. Other bodies, such as the 
osce High Commissioner on National Minorities, and notably the powerful 
EU, remained passive in the conflict, contributing little to its resolution.141
In this situation, there are not many options available to states seeking to 
promote the rights of their co-ethnics. Hungary has little leverage over Ukraine, 
and it is unlikely it would be more successful in bilateral negotiations than 
Poland or Romania were. Therefore it has chosen to engage organizations with 
the greatest influence on Ukraine: the EU and nato.
This tactic is not without precedent. Denmark achieved the consolidation 
of the situation of the Danish minority in Germany by threatening to veto West 
Germany’s nato accession in 1955.142 Indeed, this approach is already bearing 
140 Pallagi, op. cit., note 111.
141 EU Commissioner Mogherini declined to intervene, as reported in “Mogherini válasz-
levele az ukrán oktatási törvény kapcsán” [Mogherini’s response concerning the Ukraini-
an Law on Education], Kárpátalja.ma (12 April 2018), at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/kar/-
patalja/nezopont/mogherini-valaszlevele-az-ukran-oktatasi-torveny-kapcsan/>; also, 
although an osce mission visited Transcarpathia, it apparently did not discuss the Law 
on Education with local representatives: Mondik Márta, “Az ebesz képviselőivel tárgyalt 
Beregszász polgármestere” [Berehove’s mayor met with representatives of the osce], Kár-
pátalja.ma, 18 October 2018, at <http://www.karpatalja.ma/karpatalja/kozelet/az-ebesz 
-kepviseloivel-targyalt-beregszasz-polgarmestere/>.
142 Jorgen Kühl, The National Minorities in the Danish-German Border Region, (Danish Insti-
tute of Border Region Studies: Aabenraa, Denmark, 2003), 24.
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fruits in the case of Hungary as Ukraine has agreed to comply, at least formally, 
with the Venice Commission’s recommendations after being called on to do so 
by the nato Secretary General,143 who would not be involved in the conflict at 
all without Hungary’s vetoing position.
That said, it does not follow that the tactics chosen by Hungary will be suc-
cessful. Bilateral negotiations with Ukraine were unfruitful, but blocking 
Ukraine’s nato and EU accession might ultimately prove ineffective as well. In 
this case, considerable harm would have done to all those involved for no good 
reason. It remains to be seen whether the benefits outweigh the costs.
6 Conclusion
The Hungarian-Ukrainian conflict is an example of how incentives to prevent 
conflicts created by international law can lead to unfortunate outcomes. Hun-
gary has no special interest in undermining Ukraine’s efforts to protect itself 
from Russia; in fact, generally speaking, Hungary’s position has been to sup-
port Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. However, there is no tool at Hungary’s 
disposal to promote the rights of its co-ethnics other than engaging the inter-
national community by threatening Ukraine’s security interests.
This situation could have been avoided if the international community had 
been more proactive in enforcing international human rights norms related 
to minorities. Unfortunately, this has not been the situation in the case of the 
Ukrainian Law on Education. Many commentators are critical of bilateral ap-
proaches by kin-states in protecting minority rights, and for good reason.144 
Kin-states are self-interested, they have a stake in the matter, their involve-
ment leads to conflicts and can do more harm than good. But if international 
bodies are inactive, kin-states become the only actors seeking to enforce par-
ticular international norms on minority rights, precisely because they have a 
stake in the matter. Furthermore, their influence can increase if the conflict 
becomes more grave, because that attracts the attention of the international 
143 “Polish FM Calls on nato’s Stoltenberg to Intervene in Hungary-Ukraine Row”, unian, 27 
May 2018, at <https://www.unian.info/politics/10132220-polish-fm-calls-on-nato-s-stol-
tenberg-to-intervene-in-hungary-ukraine-row.html>.
144 Gudmundar Alfredsson, “Identifying Possible Disadvantages of Bilateral Agreements and 
Advancing the ‘Most-Favoured-Minority Clause’”, in Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (eds.), 
Protection of Minority Rights through Bilateral Treaties: The Case of Central Eastern Europe 
(Kluver Law International, The Hague, 1999), 173; Emma Lantschner and Roberta Medda, 
“Protection of National Minorities through Bilateral Agreements in South-Eastern Eu-
rope”, 1 eymi (2001/2002), 535–561, 541.
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 community. This counters the argument put forward by some scholars that no 
minority community would be opportunistic enough to risk a conflict just to 
attract attention.145 Not all conflicts are of a violent nature and not all stake-
holders risk a lot by bringing one about. As the specific example of Ukraine 
and Hungary shows, kin-states can arrive at a position where a conflict is per-
ceived as an acceptable price for enforcing human rights – especially if that 
goal cannot be achieved by other means.
Such bilateral conflicts could be avoided through a more proactive enforce-
ment of human rights norms by international bodies. An international court 
enforcing minority rights through individual petitions of victims is a good ex-
ample of a mechanism which would decrease the need for kin-state involve-
ment. Alternatively, states with the right to initiate proceedings against anoth-
er state might increase the activity of kin-states but would limit the conflict 
and channel it to a legal debate, which could be preferable to diplomatic hos-
tilities. Even in the absence of new mechanisms, international bodies should 
increase their efforts to enforce minority rights, otherwise they create the 
space for bilateral tensions.
The current Ukrainian–Hungarian conflict has ultimately two basic solu-
tions: (1) Hungary could withdraw its opposition to the Ukrainian law, perhaps 
after some compromise implementing legislation is passed or (2) Ukraine 
could amend its law to bring it into compliance with its international obliga-
tions. The former legitimizes a violation of international human rights norms, 
which are sure to resurface again in the future. Only the latter could achieve a 
long-lasting absence of tensions between the Ukrainian state, its minority 
communities and their kin-states.
The lack of enforcement of minority rights mechanisms not only under-
mines the goal of human rights treaties, it also undermines the goal of conflict 
prevention mechanisms, by creating perverse incentives to capture the inter-
est of the international community by presenting minority concerns as issues 
of security. This is a double-edged sword for the concerned minorities, and a 
double loss for the international community. However, in the absence of effec-
tive alternative mechanisms, this can be an effective tool at the disposal of 
kin-states with a view to enforcing international norms on minority rights.
The year 2018 was a reminder of how minority rights can still lead to grave 
tensions in and between European countries. The conflict is far from over, and 
145 Natalie Sabanadze and Vincent de Graaf, “Are Some States and Minorities More Equal 
Than Others? Double Standards and the Work of the osce High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities”, in Kristin Henrard (ed.), Double Standards Pertaining to Minority Pro-
tection (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2010), 117–143, at 133.
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will probably occupy headlines in 2019 as well. It remains to be seen whether, 
if not the parties involved, then the international community will learn from 
this year’s developments, and address the situation created by the Law on Edu-
cation. It would be to the benefit not only of Hungary, Ukraine, and the minor-
ity communities living there, but also to the integrity of the European minority 
protection system.
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